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OPEN ATTENDANCE—THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS 
OF FIGHTING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS IN 
LAW SCHOOL STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a long established principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence that the 
loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes an irreparable injury.1  At the 
same time, many people and organizations throughout the United States 
recognize homosexuality as an interest worthy of legal protection.2  
Oftentimes, however, the desire to protect homosexuals from discrimination 
conflicts with the First Amendment rights of groups or people who disapprove 
of homosexual activity.  In particular, universities all over the country are 
beginning to realize just how difficult it is to fight discrimination against 
homosexuals while maintaining respect for the free speech rights of all of their 
students.3  Over the past several years, many schools have endured struggles 
over such issues, including Arizona State University, the University of 
California’s Hastings College of Law, Ohio State University, the University of 
Minnesota, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Shippensburg 
University, Southern Illinois University School of Law, Texas Tech 
University, and Washburn University.4 
The First Amendment implications of protecting homosexual rights are 
becoming particularly prominent in America’s public law schools.5  Many 
 
 1. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373–74 (1976). 
 2. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding a Texas law making 
intimate sexual contact between consenting adults of the same sex illegal to be unconstitutional as 
a violation of the rights of liberty deriving from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding a state law 
banning gay marriage violated the Massachusetts Constitution). 
 3. See Kathleen Murphy, Can Religious Groups Exclude Non-Believers?, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 
18, 2005, § 2, at 12 (detailing recent conflicts between religious organizations and various 
schools over non-discrimination policies). 
 4. Id.; see also Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 854 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 5. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 70 
(2006) (holding the Solomon Amendment did not violate the First Amendment rights of law 
schools that wished to prevent military recruiters from interviewing on campus because of their 
stance on homosexuality); Suherwanto v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 230 Fed. App’x 
211, 213 (3d Cir. 2007) (homosexual student allegedly asked by a law school dean to leave the 
university because his sexual orientation threatened to “destroy the reputation of the law school if 
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major members of the legal community have joined those supporting the cause 
of homosexual rights.6  Hundreds of law schools have adopted policies 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation since the 1970s, 
and, in 1990, the American of Association Law Schools (AALS) unanimously 
voted to embrace sexual orientation as a protected category, which led even 
more schools to institute some variety of an anti-discrimination policy that 
aimed to prevent homosexuals from facing inequality.7  The AALS bylaws 
include a non-discrimination and affirmative action policy in its membership 
requirements that states in part that member schools are to provide equality of 
educational opportunity for all students without discrimination based upon 
sexual orientation.8  Further, a member school must attempt to pursue policies 
that give its students and graduates equal opportunity to obtain employment 
 
he remained a student”); Walker, 453 F.3d at 858 (student organization’s status revoked over 
policies on homosexuality); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484, 2006 WL 997217, at 
*3–4 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006) (student organization’s recognition refused because of policies on 
homosexuality); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 856–57 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (student 
challenged university policy that required prior permission for exercising free speech rights 
outside of certain “free speech area[s]”). 
 6. See, e.g., Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 52 (explaining that “(FAIR) is an association of law 
schools. . . . Its declared mission [includes] . . . ‘opposing discrimination and vindicat[ing] the 
rights of institutions of higher education.’  FAIR members have adopted policies expressing their 
opposition to discrimination based on, among other factors, sexual orientation.”) (internal 
citations omitted); see also infra, note 7 and accompanying text. 
 7. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 224–25 (3d. 
Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 47 (2006); Reply Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Counts III, 
IV, V, and VI of Pl.’s Compl., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, No. 4:05-cv-04070-GPM, 2005 
WL 1606448 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2005), 2005 WL 2840229; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 652–53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court has taken sides with 
homosexuals in the “culture wars” as evidenced by job interviews at America’s law schools).  
Justice Scalia added: 
[A]nyone who wishes to interview job applicants at virtually any of the Nation’s law 
schools. . .may refuse to offer a job because the applicant is a Republican; because he is 
an adulterer; because he went to the wrong prep school or belongs to the wrong country 
club; because he eats snails; because he is a womanizer; because she wears real-animal 
fur; or even because he hates the Chicago Cubs.  But if the interviewer should wish not to 
be an associate or partner of an applicant because he disapproves of the applicant's 
homosexuality, then he will have violated the pledge which the Association of American 
Law Schools requires all its member schools to exact from job interviewers: “assurance of 
the employer’s willingness” to hire homosexuals. 
Id.; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting derisively that the opinion 
in Lawrence was “the product of a Court [and] a law-profession culture, that has largely signed 
on to the so-called homosexual agenda . . . [T]he American Association of Law Schools (to which 
any reputable law school must seek to belong) excludes from membership any school that refuses 
to ban from its job-interview facilities a law firm . . . that does not wish to hire . . . a person who 
openly engages in homosexual conduct.”). 
 8. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK, § 6-4 (a), (b) 
(1990). 
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without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by expressing to all 
employers its “firm expectation that the employer will observe the principle of 
equal opportunity.”9  Thus, all member schools (which, as of January 2006, 
comprised 168 American law schools, both public and private)10 have at the 
very least voiced a belief in the importance of protecting their students from 
discrimination based on sexual orientation through their membership in AALS, 
even if they have not explicitly adopted their own non-discrimination policy 
assuring homosexual rights. 
Highlighting this ongoing tension between the First Amendment and 
homosexuality in the world of law schools, a new high-profile clash 
commenced at the Southern Illinois University School of Law, pitting the 
school’s anti-discrimination policy against its chapter of the Christian Legal 
Society’s claims for expressive association.11  In Christian Legal Society v. 
Walker, the United States Appeals Court for the Seventh Circuit reversed the 
decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, 
with direction to enter grant of the Christian Legal Society’s (CLS) motion for 
a preliminary injunction against Southern Illinois University (SIU).12  SIU had 
revoked CLS’s university status for alleged violation of SIU anti-
discrimination policies based upon a CLS policy that prevents affirmed 
homosexuals from becoming voting members.13  Because the case emerged 
from an American Bar Association and AALS accredited law school, and as 
such schools have similar anti-discrimination policies or are bound by the 
AALS policy, this decision has the potential to monumentally impact both the 
First Amendment protections, practices, and policies and the fight against 
homosexual discrimination in law school student organizations all across the 
nation. 
This Comment will first analyze the history of the major legal quarrels 
affecting protection of First Amendment rights of expressive association 
against the issue of exclusion of homosexuals from private organizations.  This 
will place an examination of the Walker decision in its proper contextual 
framework.  The Comment will then conclude with the Author’s analysis of 
the decision’s potential impact on public law schools and what steps these 
schools can take to deal with discrimination against homosexuals in their 
student organizations without violating the First Amendment rights of those 
groups. 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 2007 HANDBOOK 1, 19–22 (2007) 
available at http://www.aals.org/about_memberschools.php. 
 11. Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006); Walker, 2005 WL 
1606448. 
 12. Walker, 453 F.3d at 867. 
 13. Id. at 858. 
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I.  THE MAJOR EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION CASES LEADING TO WALKER14 
Generally speaking, First Amendment litigation did not become a part of 
the Supreme Court’s caseload until after World War I,15 and the protections of 
the amendment were not applied against the states until 1925.16  Still, the first 
major case involving the right of assembly reached the Court in 1876, where in 
United States v. Cruikshank the Court stated in dictum that the right to 
assemble peaceably: 
is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and 
guaranteed by, the United States.  The very idea of a government, republican in 
form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for 
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of 
grievances.17 
It was more than eighty years later, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, that the Court first determined the right to engage in association for 
the advancement of beliefs and ideas (described first in Cruikshank) resided in 
the Due Process Clause, stating, “It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in 
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of 
the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause . . . which embraces freedom of 
speech.”18  Read in this light, freedom of association becomes “a necessary 
precondition to free speech” even though it is “not among the Constitution’s 
explicit protections.”19  As such a “precondition,” there could be no 
meaningful value to the right of assembly if it did not also include the 
supplementary right to gather together to express and propagate ideas.  It is this 
precondition to the right of assembly with which this Comment is concerned. 
 
 14. There are, of course, many cases decided by the Supreme Court that have shaped the 
right of expressive association.  This Comment has not undertaken to give a complete history of 
those cases.  Rather, it is merely an attempt to give a brief outline of the right of expressive 
association and those cases that are particularly important to the issues arising in Walker. 
 15. MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON & LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY, MASS MEDIA 
LAW 4 (7th ed. 2005). 
 16. Id. 
 17. 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876). 
 18. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
 19. Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 649–50 (2002).  As 
Mazzone points out, there were other earlier cases where the Court intimated that the Constitution 
might contain a right to free association.  Id. at 650–51.  See, e.g., Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 
245, 250–51 (1957) (“Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall 
have the right to engage in political expression and association.”); Watkins v. United States, 354 
U.S. 178, 197–99 (1957) (“Clearly, an investigation is subject to the command that Congress 
shall make no law abridging freedom of . . . assembly. . . .  Abuses of the investigative process . . 
. [are] even more harsh when it is past . . . associations that are disclosed and judged.”); Schware 
v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957) (holding New Mexico could not 
prevent a former member of the Communist Party from practicing law merely because of his past 
association). 
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The Court has held that the right to expressive association is not absolute,20 
and thus, litigation in this area usually turns on the balance of where the right 
of association ends and the government’s right to regulate activity begins.  This 
is a question of determining the point where laws meant to assert a government 
interest interfere with the rights of a group that has gathered together to engage 
in First Amendment activity.  There are at least four ways in which a group’s 
right to expressive association can be impinged,21 but this Comment is most 
concerned with only one variety—where the government imposes a burden on 
an association that makes it more difficult or impossible for the group to 
express the message it wishes to promulgate.22  The following cases highlight 
the Court’s attempt to reach the balance between the government’s right to 
regulate associative discrimination and the First Amendment rights of its 
citizens in this regard. 
A. An Initial Foray: Healy 
A case that was quite similar to Walker emerged in 1972 in Healy v. 
James, when Central Connecticut State College (Central Connecticut) 
attempted to bar a student organization from access to its campus because the 
organization members’ beliefs were not consistent with school policy.23  In 
Healy, a group of students attempted to organize a local chapter of Students for 
a Democratic Society (SDS) at Central Connecticut.24  The school was worried 
about the group’s affiliation with the national branch of SDS.25  SDS stated it 
would not be affiliated with the national organization of SDS and would 
instead be “completely independent.”26  The Student Affairs Committee voted 
to approve the request for official recognition, but the President of the College 
rejected this vote and decided not to grant SDS official recognition.27  He ruled 
that SDS’s philosophy was adverse to Central Connecticut policies and that its 
independence from the national organization was suspect,28 concluding that 
recognition should not be given to any organization that “openly repudiates” 
 
 20. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). 
 21. See Mazzone, supra note 19, at 651–55.  The government interferes with a group’s right 
of expressive association when its actions constitutes a burden or denial to an individual (or 
group) of benefits that increases the costs associated with membership because of associational 
ties, when it imposes a requirement of associational membership to receive a benefit from the 
government, and when the government uses a group of citizens to advance the government’s own 
desired expression.  Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 408 U.S. 169, 174–76 (1972). 
 24. Id. at 172. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 173–74. 
 28. Healy, 408 U.S. at 174–75. 
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Central Connecticut’s interest in and commitment to “academic freedom.”29  
SDS filed suit against Central Connecticut, with the complaint alleging denial 
of First Amendment rights of expression and association.30 
Justice Powell’s unanimous opinion in favor of SDS reversed both the trial 
court and Second Circuit’s decisions dismissing the case.31  The Court 
acknowledged Central Connecticut’s refusal to recognize SDS would amount 
to an abridgment of the SDS’s First Amendment right to free association if 
recognition was denied without justification.32  Central Connecticut did not 
argue it had a proper justification for infringing SDS’s rights, but instead 
claimed that denial of recognition did not constitute a violation of SDS’s rights 
because it could still meet off of campus, could still distribute written materials 
off the campus, and could still meet with each other on campus in an informal 
capacity as individuals—they simply could not do so as a university-
recognized chapter of SDS.33  The Court was willing to concede that Central 
Connecticut had not directly interfered with SDS’s fundamental First 
Amendment rights, but it rejected the idea that the Constitution’s protections 
are limited only to such direct interference.34  Rather, the Constitution also 
prevents “more subtle governmental interference.”35  Thus, Justice Powell 
ordered the case to be remanded, emphasizing the Court’s “dedication to the 
principles of the Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society is 
founded.”36 
 
 29. Id. at 175–76.  The president’s finding that the SDS was not compatible with university 
interest in academic freedom was based primarily upon the university’s “Statement on Rights, 
Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students,” which was referred to as the “Student Bill of 
Rights.”  In particular, Part V of that statement held: 
College students and student organizations shall have the right to examine and discuss all 
questions of interest to them, to express opinion publicly and privately, and to support 
causes by orderly means.  They may organize public demonstrations and protest 
gatherings and utilize the right of petition.  Students do not have the right to deprive 
others of the opportunity to speak or be heard, to invade the privacy of others, to damage 
the property of others, to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college, or to 
interfere with the rights of others. 
See id. at 175 n.5.  Apparently, the president believed SDS would not comply with some aspect of 
this statement. 
 30. Id. at 177. 
 31. Id. at 194. 
 32. Id. at 181. 
 33. Healy, 408 U.S. at 182–83. 
 34. Id. at 183. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 194. 
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B. The Court Narrows the Right of Expressive Association 
Until the 1980s, the Court was usually quite protective of the rights of 
private groups or individuals to associate with those they wished.37  Starting in 
1984, however, in three successive cases, the Court narrowed the scope of 
protection offered to such private groups by the right of expressive 
association.38 
1. Roberts 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Jaycees sued government officials 
from the state of Minnesota because its Human Rights Act prohibited sex 
discrimination in places of public accommodation, arguing that forcing them to 
accept women as members violated their First Amendment rights.39  Justice 
Brennan authored the 7–0 decision reversing the Eighth Circuit and finding 
that the Minnesota anti-discrimination law did not violate the Jaycees’ First 
Amendment rights.40 
The Court did find that the Jaycees were entitled to First Amendment 
protection because of the many civic, charitable, lobbying, and fundraising 
activities in which they engaged.41  Flowing from these protected activities, the 
right of expressive association was “plainly implicated” by the Jaycees’ 
lawsuit.42  In fact, Justice Brennan opined that the Minnesota law clearly was 
an infringement upon the Jaycees’ associational rights because 
[t]here can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or 
affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept 
 
 37. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977) (holding that non-
union teachers in a public school could not be required to finance the expressive activities of the 
union); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 61 (1973) (striking an Illinois law that prohibited voting 
in the primary of one party within twenty-three months of voting in different party’s primary); 
Healy, 408 U.S. at 194; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480, 490 (1960) (teachers in Arkansas 
challenged a state law requiring disclosure of all memberships to which the teacher had belonged 
or regularly contributed within the preceding five years as a condition of employment, and the 
majority held this infringed their rights to free association, even though the state had an interest in 
ensuring it had hired qualified educators); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 
466 (1958) (holding that a state court order requiring the NAACP to divulge its membership lists 
violated the NAACP’s members of their right to freedom of association). 
 38. See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary 
Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609 (1984).  The Author has omitted discussion of Rotary because the Court’s analysis was 
substantially similar to Roberts and further discussion would be largely repetitive. 
 39. 468 U.S. at 612.  The Jaycees also claimed that the law violated their right to intimate 
association, but this Comment focuses solely on the expressive association claim.  See id. at 618. 
 40. Id. at 612.  Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun did not participate in the decision.  
Id. at 631. 
 41. Id. at 626–27. 
 42. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. 
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members it does not desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of the 
original members to express only those views that brought them together.43 
Justice Brennan quickly pointed out, however, that the mere existence of 
associational rights was not dispositive, because the “[t]he right to associate for 
expressive purposes is not . . . absolute.”44  If a state can survive strict scrutiny 
by showing it infringed on First Amendment rights to serve a compelling 
interest that is unrelated to the suppression of ideas and cannot be achieved 
through means significantly less intrusive on associational freedom, the law 
can survive.45 
In this case, the Court found all three elements of strict scrutiny were 
satisfied and thus rejected the Jaycees’ claim.  First, the Court found that 
Minnesota clearly had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination 
against women in places of public accommodation that could trump the impact 
the law might have on the Jaycees’ First Amendment rights.46  Second, the law 
was content neutral, both facially and as applied, and thus there were no 
concerns that the state’s goal in fighting discrimination was related to the 
suppression of ideas.47  Finally, the Court was also convinced that Minnesota 
was attempting to advance its interest in the least restrictive means possible.48  
Particularly important to this last finding was the Court’s contention that the 
Jaycees had been unable to demonstrate that the law actually worked to impose 
any kind of “serious burdens on the male members’ freedom of expressive 
association.”49 
Specifically, the court was unconvinced that the many civic, charitable, 
lobbying, fundraising activities, or the messages of the Jaycees would actually 
be impeded simply by admitting women.  The Jaycees had long allowed 
women to share in its views and participate in various Jaycees’ activities, thus 
rejecting “sexual stereotyping” without substantial proof that “by allowing 
women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change the content or 
impact of the organization’s speech.”50  In light of this analysis, the Court 
found that the Minnesota law survived strict scrutiny and it rejected the 
Jaycees’ challenge.51 
 
 43. Id. at 623. 
 44. Id. at 623. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623–24. 
 48. Id. at 626. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 628. 
 51. Id. at 631. 
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2. New York State Club 
The actual decision in New York State Club Association v. City of New 
York was not earth shattering in the wake of Roberts and Rotary; after those 
decisions it was little surprise the Court held that a New York City ordinance 
that prohibited racial, religious, or sexual discrimination by certain private 
athletic clubs with at least 400 members did not violate the First Amendment 
right of expressive association.52  Justice White’s majority opinion avoided the 
strict scrutiny analysis from Roberts and Rotary, however, relying largely on 
the fact that the challenging clubs were unable to show that the ordinance 
would in any way prevent them from “advocat[ing] public or private 
viewpoints,” and that any club that wanted to keep out individuals who did not 
share its views still could do so, because “the Law erects no obstacle to this . . . 
[but] merely prevents an association from using race, sex, and the other 
specified characteristics as shorthand measures in place of what the city 
considers to be more legitimate criteria for determining membership.”53 
New York State Club mattered not for what the Court decided about the 
clubs themselves, but because, for the first time, the Court enunciated what a 
litigant would have to do to win on a claim of expressive association: “an 
association might be able to show that it is organized for specific expressive 
purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly 
as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the same 
sex, for example, or the same religion.”54  If an association cannot show that an 
anti-discrimination law prevents it from keeping out those “who do not share 
the views that the club’s members wish to promote,” the law being challenged 
does not violate the First Amendment and the group will have to abide by the 
regulation.55 
C. The First Clash Between Expressive Association and Homosexuality: 
Hurley 
The year 1995 witnessed the right of expressive association’s first high-
profile clash with homosexuality.  In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & 
Bisexual Group of Boston, a unanimous court held that a Massachusetts law 
that required the organizers of a private parade to include an association of 
homosexual marchers it had refused to admit violated the First Amendment 
because it forced the organizers to impart a message they did not wish to 
convey.56  Writing for the Court, Justice Souter rejected any notion that a 
 
 52. N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 12–14 (1988). 
 53. Id. at 13. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 559 
(1995). 
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parade was not expressive activity,57 and thus, when Massachusetts forced the 
parade to include the contingent of homosexual marchers, it “violate[d] the 
fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has 
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”58 
This holding reinforced the idea that Justice White’s test from New York 
State Club—whether a group could show its message had actually been 
impinged—had become the Court’s chief consideration in ruling on claims of 
expressive association.  It also signified a shift away from the limitations on 
expressive association represented by Roberts, Rotary, and New York State 
Club. 
Of particular importance was the Court’s reluctance to require that the 
association articulate a specific message that would be impaired.59  In fact, the 
parade council never identified how including the homosexual marchers in its 
parade would impair its message, or even what that message was, but the Court 
was content to find that the probable message the council disfavored was “not 
difficult to identify.”60  Thus, Hurley was particularly sweeping because the 
claimants were not required to identify their intended message or how the 
presence of homosexuals impaired that message.  At the time, Hurley seemed 
to stand for the idea that Justice White’s language of New York State Club61 
had enabled the Court to greatly expand the protections of expressive 
association. 
D. The Boy Scouts Usher in the Dale-era of Expressive Association 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale is probably the most important expressive 
association case to date.62  In Dale, an openly gay assistant scoutmaster 
brought suit under a New Jersey public accommodations law that prohibited 
discrimination based on sexual orientation after the Boy Scouts kicked him out 
of the organization because he was a homosexual.63  Writing for a 5–4 
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the law violated the Boy Scouts’ 
rights of expressive association and the Scouts could not be forced to admit 
homosexual members.64 
 
 57. Id. at 559, 568. 
 58. Id. at 573. 
 59. Id. at 569 (“[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection.”). 
 60. Id. at 574–75 (“The parade’s organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality 
to be so, or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have some 
other reason for wishing to keep GLIB’s message out of the parade.”). 
 61. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 62. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 63. Id. at 643–44. 
 64. Id. at 642–44. 
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The Court noted initially that even though forced inclusion of unwanted 
individuals can infringe on a group’s freedom of expressive association, the 
right to expressive association is not absolute and could be abrogated by 
regulations that survive strict scrutiny.65  Thus, to analyze a claimed violation 
of expressive association, a group must first show that it engages in expressive 
association, though the group does not have to specifically be an “advocacy 
group . . . .”66  Because this standard of “engag[ing] in expressive association” 
is so broad, the Court had no problem finding that the Boy Scouts engaged in 
expressive association.67 
Once a group has made this threshold showing, the Court analyzes whether 
the forced inclusion of the unwanted individual significantly affects the 
group’s ability to promote its views either publicly or privately.68  In this case, 
that analysis required the Court to “explore, to a limited extent, the nature of 
the Boy Scouts’ view of homosexuality.”69  This “limited extent” was quite 
restricted indeed; the Court merely quoted the Boy Scouts’ position on the 
issue from the Scouts’ own brief—that they taught that homosexual conduct 
was not “morally straight” and they did not want to “to promote homosexual 
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior,”70—and then the Court exercised 
almost complete deference to the claim.  The Court stated, “We accept the Boy 
Scouts’ assertion.  We need not inquire further to determine the nature of the 
Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to homosexuality.”71  Having accepted the 
Boy Scouts’ claims of what its view of homosexuality was, it was no surprise 
that the Court also accepted the contention that admitting Mr. Dale as an 
assistant scoutmaster would significantly impair the ability to express its 
opinion that homosexual behavior was not legitimate: “As we give deference 
to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must 
also give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its 
expression.”72 
The Court’s acceptance of the Boy Scouts’ claim of infringement was 
based on finding that allowing Dale to be a scoutmaster “would, at the very 
least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and 
 
 65. Id. at 648. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 650. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 651 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 71. Id.  The Court did go on to recount various pieces of evidence showing the Boy Scouts 
disapproved of homosexuality to demonstrate the sincerity of their belief, but it seems clear this 
was not a necessary step.  See id. at 651–53. 
 72. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. 
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the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate 
form of behavior.”73  Just as how in Hurley 
the presence of GLIB in Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade would have 
interfered with the parade organizers’ choice not to propound a particular point 
of view, the presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely 
interfere with the Boy Scouts’ choice not to propound a point of view contrary 
to its beliefs.74 
The Court refused to alter its finding based on claims that not all members of 
the Boy Scouts agreed with the official position, because “the First 
Amendment simply does not require that every member of a group agree on 
every issue . . . .”75  Rather, the official position of a group is the one that is 
“sufficient” to merit the protections of the First Amendment.76 
Having found the law would infringe on the Boy Scouts’ rights, the Court 
moved to the last step in the analysis of an expressive association claim—
determining if the state interest supported the infringement on the group’s 
expressive association.77  Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, the Court largely 
sidestepped the issue of whether the protection of homosexuals against 
discrimination constituted a compelling state interest.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
noted how the Court had found the state interest in Roberts and Rotary to be 
compelling, indicating that those cases had turned on the nature of the state 
claim, but he quickly qualified that implication by reiterating that at the same 
time, the associations in those cases had been unable to show the inclusion of 
the unwanted individual would significantly burden the ability to express the 
messages desired.78  Leaving the issue murky, the Court concluded that the law 
impaired the rights of the Boy Scouts and the “interests embodied in New 
Jersey’s public accommodations law [did] not justify such a severe intrusion 
on the Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association.”79  Intimating, 
but not explicitly holding, that the state’s interest in protecting homosexuals 
from discrimination was unqualified to abrogate the group’s First Amendment 
rights, the Court held that the Boy Scouts could not be compelled to admit a 
homosexual scoutmaster against its wishes.80 
While Dale did not make it completely clear exactly what type of groups 
could succeed on an expressive association claim (particularly due to the 
majority’s refusal to explicitly confirm the implied message—that the 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 654. 
 75. Id. at 655. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Dale, 530 U.S. at 656. 
 78. Id. at 657–58. 
 79. Id. at 659. 
 80. Id. at 661. 
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protection of homosexuals does not count as a compelling interest), on close 
inspection the case appears to represent at least a small step back from the 
sweeping language of Hurley.  First, unlike in Hurley, the majority required the 
association to identify its message and how admittance of the unwanted 
individual would impair that message.81  Second, the decision was far from 
unanimous (unlike Roberts, Rotary, New York State Club, and Hurley), with 
four Justices dissenting,82 indicating that deference to the state’s interest in 
fighting discrimination had not completely dissipated.  On this view, Dale 
appears to be a return to Roberts rather than Hurley, despite the fact that the 
decision ultimately upheld expressive rights. 
E. Law Schools Finally Get Involved: Rumsfeld 
In 2006, law schools finally grappled firsthand with the issue of 
homosexuality and expressive association in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic 
and Institutional Rights, Inc.,83 foreshadowing the impending conflict that 
arose in Walker, as well as those that will likely continue around the country.  
In Rumsfeld, an association of law schools, the Forum for Academic and 
Institutional Rights (FAIR), filed suit alleging that the Solomon Amendment84 
violated its rights of free speech and expressive association.85  The Solomon 
Amendment provided for the denial of certain federal funding to universities 
that refused to grant access to military recruiters that was at least equal to the 
access granted to other employers.86  FAIR objected to allowing military 
recruiters on law school campuses because of the policies Congress has 
adopted regarding homosexuals in the military, claiming it would force the 
schools to either give up federal funds or stop enforcing their own policies that 
prevented recruitment activities on campus by employers who did not comply 
with the FAIR non-discrimination policy.87  Chief Justice Roberts authored the 
8–0 opinion holding that the Solomon Amendment did not violate the First 
Amendment and thereby did not infringe on the expressive association rights 
of FAIR or its member law schools.88 
FAIR argued that, similar to the situation in Dale, allowing military 
recruiters on campus would impair its capacity “to express [its] message that 
 
 81. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text. 
 82. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer, filed a strongly worded 
and lengthy dissent taking issue with the majority’s holding that the Boy Scouts’ message would 
be impaired.  See Dale, 530 U.S. at 663–700 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 83. 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 84. See 10 U.S.C. § 983 (Supp. 2004). 
 85. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 51.  This Comment will discuss only the expressive association 
claim. 
 86. Id. at 52–53. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 70.  Justice Alito did not participate in the decision.  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1262 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1249 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is wrong.”89  The Court, 
however, distinguished Dale from the facts of the instant case, saying the 
Solomon Amendment did not force law schools to offer membership to those 
with whom they disagreed, which had been the crux of the violation of 
expressive association in Dale.90  The military recruiters, as well as any other 
employer coming on campus, remained as outsiders of the law school 
community, and the Court labeled this distinction as “critical.”91  Because the 
“[s]tudents and faculty are free to associate to voice their disapproval of the 
military’s message” and because “nothing about the statute affects the 
composition of the group by making group membership less desirable[,]” the 
Court held that “[a] military recruiter’s mere presence . . . does not violate 
a law school’s right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the law school 
considers the recruiter’s message.”92  
Rumsfeld made the Dale decision clearer in at least one respect, showing 
that despite the Court’s fairly broad level of deference to a group’s claims that 
granting inclusion to certain individuals would impair its ability to spread its 
message,93 there must be more to the story.  At the very least, the group must 
show that the inclusion complained of truly was “forced,” and that this 
inclusion prevented them from adequately associating “to voice their . . . 
message.”94  It was in this context that the conflict in Walker emerged. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF WALKER 
In February of 2005, officials at the SIU School of Law received a 
complaint about the membership policies of the campus chapter of the 
Christian Legal Society because the group did not allow active homosexuals to 
hold leadership positions or become voting members.95  On or about February 
16, 2005, school officials informed Winter Ramsey (Ramsey), President of 
CLS at the University, of the complaint.96  CLS was then asked for a copy of 
its statement of membership and leadership policies,97 and Ramsey replied in 
an e-mail that included the following statement regarding CLS policies: 
 
 89. Id. at 68. 
 90. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 68–70. 
 91. Id. at 69. 
 92. Id. at 69–70. 
 93. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000); supra notes 68–76 and 
accompanying text. 
 94. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 70. 
 95. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 96. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8, Christian Legal Soc’y v. 
Walker, No. 05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448 (S.D. Ill. July 5, 2005), rev’d, 453 F.3d 853 (7th 
Cir. 2006), 2005 WL 975978. 
 97. Id. 
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  The SIU Chapter of Christian Legal Society has discussed and voted . . . 
[and] our membership policy is below. 
  All members of the national CLS . . . are required to sign a Statement of 
Faith. This Statement of Faith indicates the member holds certain Christian 
viewpoints . . . . 
  Any student is welcome to participate in CLS chapter meetings and other 
activities, regardless of religion, creed, sexual orientation or member or non-
membership in any other protected class.  However, pursuant to the 
constitution and rules for CLS student chapters of the national CLS, members 
and officers are required to sign and endeavor to live by the national CLS’ 
Statement of Faith. 
  CLS interprets its Statement of Faith to require that officers and members 
adhere to orthodox Christian beliefs, including the Bible’s prohibition on 
sexual conduct between persons of the same sex.  A person who engages in 
homosexual conduct or adheres to the viewpoint that homosexual conduct is 
not sinful would not be permitted to serve as a CLS chapter officer or member.  
A person who may have engaged in homosexual conduct in the past but has 
repented of that conduct, or who has homosexual inclinations but does not 
engage in or affirm homosexual conduct, would not be prevented from serving 
as an officer or member.98 
On March 25, 2005, upon receipt and review of CLS’s statement of 
policies, the Dean of the Law School informed CLS that it would no longer 
receive SIU recognition due to its refusal to allow active homosexuals to join 
its ranks.99  The Dean informed CLS that its refusal violated two University 
policies—SIU’s Affirmative Action/Equal Employment Opportunity Policy 
and a policy of the SIU Board of Trustees.100  The Affirmative Action policy 
stated in its relevant portions that SIU would “provide equal employment and 
education opportunities for all qualified persons without regard to race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, status as a disabled veteran of the 
 
 98. Id. at 8–9.  CLS’s Statement of Faith is as follows: 
Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in:  
“One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth. 
The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's only Son conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of 
the virgin Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through which we receive eternal life; 
His bodily resurrection and personal return. 
The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration. 
The Bible as the inspired Word of God.” 
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, No. 05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 5, 
2005). 
 99. Brief of Defendant-Appellees at 5–6, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 
(2006) (No. 05-3239), 2005 WL 3738600. 
 100. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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Vietnam era, sexual orientation, or marital status.”101  The Board of Trustees 
policy ordered that “[n]o student constituency body or recognized student 
organization shall be authorized unless it adheres to all appropriate federal or 
state laws concerning nondiscrimination and equal opportunity.”102 
As a result of derecognition, CLS could not: 
[R]eserve law school rooms for private meetings . . . was denied access 
to law school bulletin boards, representation on the law school’s 
website or in its publications, and the liberty to refer to itself as the 
“SIU Chapter of” the Christian Legal Society.  Finally, CLS was 
stripped of an official faculty advisor, free use of the SIU School of 
Law auditorium, access to the law school’s List-Serve, and any funds 
provided to registered student organizations.103 
Shortly thereafter, on April 5, 2005, CLS filed suit in the Southern District 
of Illinois against SIU and law school officials in their official capacity, 
alleging a violation of its rights to expressive association and free speech.104  
Exactly three months later, the district court denied CLS’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction against SIU that would have reinstated its official 
status.105 
CLS appealed the denial of its motion to the Seventh Circuit, and on July 
10, 2006, the court reversed the district court’s decision, remanding the case 
with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction against SIU, which would 
effectively reinstate CLS as a University-recognized student organization.106  
The court held that CLS had likely not violated the SIU policies and further 
found that CLS was likely to succeed on its claims that SIU had violated its 
right to expressive association by “revoking its recognized student organization 
status” and its right of free speech by excluding it “from a speech forum in 
which it had a right to remain.”107 
 
 101. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 102. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 103. Id.  The court noted that CLS could have meetings on campus, but they would not be 
assured of privacy. 
 104. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 96, at 12–15.  CLS 
also alleged violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, 
and violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but these issues will not be discussed here, as the majority opinion focused only on 
the free speech and expressive association claims. 
 105. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, No. 05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *3 (S.D. Ill. 
July 5, 2005). 
 106. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 107. Id. at 859–60. 
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III.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT OPINION 
A. The Majority Finds Irreparable Injury and Likelihood of Success 
By a 2–1 decision, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district 
court’s denial of CLS’s motion for injunction, providing CLS with 
reinstatement as an officially recognized student organization at the SIU 
School of Law.108  Judge Sykes authored the majority opinion and began by 
laying out the background of SIU’s relationship with its student 
organization.109 
SIU encourages the formation of student organizations, specifically 
offering several benefits that are not available to individual students outside of 
the parameters of group affiliation—access to the law school’s database of e-
mail addresses, authorization to post information on SIU Law bulletin boards, 
inclusion of the group on lists of official student organizations at SIU (both in 
law school publications and on the SIU’s website), the ability to reserve 
conference rooms, the ability to hold meetings, storage space at the law school, 
a faculty advisor, and finally, allocation of funds from the SIU budget.110  The 
law school at SIU had at least seventeen officially recognized student 
organizations during the 2004–2005 academic year.111 
CLS is a national affiliation of law students, attorneys, and other legal 
professional across the country who have united over their shared common 
religious belief in Christianity.112  To be a member of CLS, one must subscribe 
to the CLS statement of faith and agree to live one’s life in accordance with 
particular moral values.113  The case at hand arose over one of the values CLS 
members must subscribe to; namely, that sexual relations are forbidden outside 
of what CLS considers the traditional forum for such activities—one man and 
one woman in a monogamous, marital relationship.114  This framework for 
sexual activity means CLS disapproves of fornication, adultery, and 
homosexuality.115  Nonetheless, despite its disapproval of such activities, CLS 
does allow any person to attend its meetings; it simply does not allow anyone 
 
 108. Id. at 867. 
 109. Id. at 856. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Walker, 453 F.3d at 857.  The court included a partial list of the SIU Law student 
organizations, naming “the Black Law Student Association, the Federalist Society, the Hispanic 
Law Student Association, Law School Democrats, Lesbian and Gay Law Students and 
Supporters, SIU Law School Republicans, the Student Animal Legal Defense Fund, Women's 
Law Forum, and CLS.”  Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id at 857–58; see also Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra 
note 96, at 8–9. 
 114. Id. at 858. 
 115. Id. 
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to be a member or have a vote in CLS decisions that does not approve the CLS 
Statement of Faith or who engages in any of these activities without having 
repented.116 
The majority rejected the district court’s finding against CLS and outlined 
three reasons117 CLS was likely to succeed on the merits, any one of which was 
sufficient to carry its burden and merit reversal.118  First, the court was 
unconvinced CLS had actually violated any SIU policy, the ostensible grounds 
for derecognition.119  Second, the court found CLS had succeeded in showing 
the likelihood that SIU had illegally infringed on its rights of expressive 
association.120  Finally, CLS had been able to show the likelihood that SIU had 
violated its free speech rights by expelling it from a forum of speech in which 
it was entitled to remain.121 
Turning to its first point, the majority found it “doubtful” that CLS had 
actually violated any SIU policy.122  SIU first alleged CLS was in violation of a 
Board of Trustee’s policy that refused recognition for any student organization 
that did not comply with all federal and state laws regarding equal opportunity 
and nondiscrimination, but the court found that through all the proceedings, 
SIU had failed to identify a single statute which CLS had violated.123  This 
failure “raises the specter of pretext; [and] . . . this asserted ground for 
derecognition simply drops out of the case.”124 
SIU also alleged CLS violated the University’s Affirmative Action/EEO 
policy,125 which required SIU to “provide equal employment and education 
opportunities . . . without regard to . . . sexual orientation.”126  The majority 
was “skeptical” of any claim CLS had violated this policy because it did not 
actually exclude anyone based on sexual orientation, but rather required only 
adherence by its members to its belief system regarding sexual conduct.127  
Because CLS believes it is sinful to engage in any sexual conduct outside the 
context of marriage between one man and one woman, it refuses to offer 
membership only to those persons not willing to conform their actions to this 
 
 116. Walker, 453 F.3d at 858. 
 117. There were numerous claims involved in the initial lawsuit that were not addressed in the 
appeal but have not been waived and thus could be decided upon remand.  Id. at 860 n.1. 
 118. Id. at 859. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Walker, 453 F. 3d at 859–60. 
 122. Id. at 860. 
 123. Id.  See supra note 102 and accompanying text for the relevant language of the Board of 
Trustees’ policy. 
 124. Walker, 453 F.3d at 860. 
 125. Id.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text for the relevant language of the 
Affirmative Action/EEO policy. 
 126. Walker, 453 F.3d at 860. 
 127. Id. 
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belief, regardless of whether the sexual actions are of a homosexual or 
heterosexual nature.128  In fact, CLS interprets its membership policies to allow 
a person of “homosexual inclinations” to be a member, so long as they do not 
participate in or condone sexual activity (presumably either heterosexual or 
homosexual) outside of marriage, and since this is the exact same requirement 
to which a heterosexual must adhere to become a member, the policies enable 
CLS to treat all prospective members in the same manner.129  The court also 
noted there was no language in the SIU policy prohibiting distinctions based 
on belief or conduct rather than upon personal status.130 
The court also found other reasons to be skeptical of SIU’s claims about 
the policy violations.  First, since CLS does not employ anyone, the court was 
not convinced that the Affirmative Action/EEO policy even applied to it.131  
More importantly, the court relied on Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of 
University of Virginia132 to hold that affiliated (even if subsidized) student 
organizations engage only in private speech and are not conduits of a 
university’s message, and thus the CLS was not a “mouthpiece . . . for the 
university.”133  Relying on all of these reasons, the court concluded that CLS 
was likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.134 
The court then turned to an analysis of the second issue—whether CLS 
was likely to succeed on the issue of expressive association.  The majority 
cited Dale for the proposition that there is “no clearer example of an intrusion 
into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that 
forces the group to accept members it does not desire,”135 and also reiterated 
that the freedom to associate “plainly presupposes a freedom not to 
associate.”136  The court also reaffirmed, however, that the Constitution does 
not prohibit laws that limit rights of expressive association if such laws can 
survive strict scrutiny.137  To make its determination of whether CLS’s rights 
had been infringed by SIU, the court analyzed three questions: “(1) Is CLS an 
expressive association? (2) Would the forced inclusion of active homosexuals 
significantly affect CLS’s ability to express its disapproval of homosexual 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Walker, 453 F.3d at 860. 
 132. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (interpreting the Establishment Clause and holding that a state 
university could not withhold funding from a student publication based on the religious content 
and views of the publication). 
 133. Walker, 453 F.3d at 861. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)). 
 136. Id. (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (quoting Roberts, 
468 U.S. at 623)). 
 137. Id. at 861–62 (internal citation omitted). 
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activity? and (3) Does CLS’s interest in expressive association outweigh the 
university’s interest in eradicating discrimination against homosexuals?”138 
The answer to the first question was fairly apparent in light of the broad 
standard applied to this question in Dale139—CLS is an expressive 
association.140  The court explained that CLS is an expressive association 
because it 
is a group of people bound together by their shared Christian faith and a 
commitment to “[s]howing the love of Christ to the campus community . . . by 
proclaiming the gospel in word and deed” and “[a]ddressing the question, 
‘What does it mean to be a Christian in law?’”  Members must dedicate 
themselves to the moral principles embodied in CLS’s statement of faith; one 
of those principles is affirmance of “certain Biblical standards for sexual 
morality.”  CLS interprets the Bible to prohibit sexual conduct outside of a 
traditional marriage between one man and one woman.  As such, CLS 
disapproves of fornication, adultery, and homosexual conduct, and believes 
that participation in or affirmation of such sexual activity is inconsistent with 
its statement of beliefs.141 
In light of CLS’s shared expressive conduct, the court concluded that “[i]t 
would be hard to argue—and no one does—that CLS is not an expressive 
association.”142 
The answer to the second question—would the forced inclusion of active 
homosexuals significantly affect CLS’s ability to express its disapproval of 
homosexual activity—was more contentious, but the court did not find the 
issue to be complicated, saying that to even ask the question was “very nearly 
to answer it.”143  As such, the court “ha[d] no difficulty concluding that SIU’s 
application of its . . . policies . . . burdens CLS’s ability to express its ideas.”144  
Because “CLS’s beliefs about sexual morality are among its defining values; 
forcing it to accept as members those who engage in or approve of homosexual 
conduct would cause the group . . . to cease to exist.”145  Further, since one of 
its specific values is that sexual conduct outside the scope of marriage between 
one man and one woman is sinful, “[i]t would be difficult for CLS to sincerely 
and effectively convey a message of disapproval of . . . [such] conduct if, at the 
same time, it must accept members who engage in that conduct.”146 
 
 138. Walker, 453 F.3d at 862. 
 139. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648; supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 140. Walker, 453 F.3d at 862. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 863. 
 145. Walker, 453 F.3d at 863. 
 146. Id. 
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As SIU’s derecognition violated CLS’s expressive association rights, its 
action would have to survive strict scrutiny, and the court was forced to 
analyze if SIU’s interest in stopping discrimination against homosexuals 
outweighed CLS’s interest in expressing disapproval of homosexual activity.147  
The court willingly accepted that a state has an interest in curbing 
discriminatory conduct, as well as in ensuring equal opportunity to access of 
educational benefits, but it also reiterated that these interests cannot “be 
applied to expressive conduct with the purpose of either suppressing or 
promoting a particular viewpoint.”148 
On this front, the court sided squarely with CLS: 
What interest does SIU have in forcing CLS to accept members whose 
activities violate its creed other than eradicating or neutralizing particular 
beliefs contained in that creed?  SIU has identified none.  The only apparent 
point of applying the policy to an organization like CLS is to induce CLS to 
modify the content of its expression or suffer the penalty of derecognition.149 
In contrast to this language strongly disapproving of SIU’s interest in 
regulating CLS, the court noted that CLS’s interest in effecting its 
constitutional rights was “unquestionably substantial”150 because the “First 
Amendment protects expression, be it of the popular variety or not.”151  
Further, “public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization’s 
expression does not justify the State’s effort to compel the organization to 
accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the 
organization’s expressive message.”152  Consequently, since SIU presented no 
compelling interest, its policy could not survive strict scrutiny, and CLS once 
again had shown a likelihood of success on the merits for its claim of 
expressive association.153 
Additionally, the majority rejected the claim that the SIU policy did not 
amount to a “forced inclusion” case such as Hurley or Dale.154  The dissent 
contended this was not a forced-inclusion case at all; rather, CLS remained free 
to prohibit those who do not share its beliefs from becoming members—it 
simply could not do so on SIU’s dollar.155  The majority assumed, however, 
that Healy controlled on this issue and that derecognition itself turned the 
application of the policy into a forced-inclusion case because “the Court [in 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 149. Id. (emphasis added). 
 150. Walker, 453 F.3d at 863. 
 151. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 152. Id. at 863–64 (internal citation omitted). 
 153. Id. at 864. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Walker, 453 F.3d at 873–74 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
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Healy] . . . drew a distinction between rules directed at a student organization’s 
actions and rules directed at its advocacy or philosophy; the former might 
provide permissible justification for nonrecognition, but the latter do not.”156  
The court ruled that the present case was “legally indistinguishable” from 
Healy and thus there was little doubt CLS had presented a forced-inclusion 
claim or that it should prevail upon it.157 
At that point, the majority turned to its analysis of the free speech claim.  
The CLS claim was that the government violates the First Amendment when it 
“excludes a speaker from a speech forum the speaker is entitled to enter.”158  It 
argued SIU had created such a forum for its student organizations, and 
derecognition effectively expelled them from that forum even though there was 
no compelling reason justifying the action.159  The court found that SIU had 
created a public forum for its student organizations,160 and the label given to 
the forum was not vital to the legal conclusion because even under the standard 
of review most favorable to SIU, CLS still had “the better of the argument.”161 
CLS’s argument on the free speech violation triumphed because, even 
though SIU’s policies were neutral on their face, there was evidence they had 
been applied in a way that discriminated on the basis of viewpoint.162  The 
court explained: 
  Once the government has set the boundaries of its forum, it may not 
renege; it must respect its own self-imposed boundaries. 
. . . . 
  . . . According to the present record evidence, CLS is the only student 
group that has been stripped of its recognized status on the basis that it 
discriminates on a ground prohibited by SIU’s . . . policy.  CLS presented 
 
 156. Id. at 864 (majority opinion) (internal citation omitted). 
 157. Id.  The dissent distinguished Healy by saying the difference was that the student 
organization was not even allowed to meet on the university’s campus or coffee shop, whereas in 
the present case CLS could still meet at school and had other ample alternative channels for 
communicating with each other.  Id. at 874 (Woods, J., dissenting).  While the point of this 
Comment is not to discuss the difference between forced-inclusion cases and the mere refusal to 
provide a forum for a group’s speech, Healy strongly suggests the Supreme Court does not favor 
the dissent’s analysis on this issue.  See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972) (“[P]ossible 
ability to exist outside the campus community does not ameliorate significantly the disabilities 
imposed by [nonrecognition].”). 
 158. Walker, 453 F.3d 865, 865 (internal citation omitted). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 866 n.2 (“Accordingly, while the parties appeared to agree at oral argument 
that we are probably dealing with a ‘limited public forum,’ we will not hold them to that 
agreement because they were plainly arguing for different levels of scrutiny and the ‘forum’ 
terminology has not always been clear.”). 
 161. Id. at 866. 
 162. Id. 
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evidence that other recognized student organizations discriminate in their 
membership requirements on grounds prohibited by SIU’s policy.  The Muslim 
Students’ Association . . . limits membership to Muslims.  Similarly, 
membership in the Adventist Campus Ministries is limited to those “professing 
the Seventh Day Adventist Faith, and all other students who are interested in 
studying the Holy Bible and applying its principles.” Membership in the 
Young Women’s Coalition is for women only . . . . 
  For whatever reason, SIU has applied its antidiscrimination policy to CLS 
alone . . . .  SIU contends there is no evidence that other groups would continue 
to discriminate if threatened with nonrecognition, but that argument is a 
nonstarter.  SIU’s . . . policy, which SIU insists applies to all student 
organizations, is a standing threat of nonrecognition; assuming it applies, that 
is the whole point of the policy.163 
The majority conceded that a final decision on the reasonableness of the 
policy was not appropriate since the actual purposes of the policy had not been 
fully argued.164  And while the court acknowledged that the record was 
“spartan” on SIU’s purposes for the speech forum, it asserted that was not 
dispositive since CLS was able to show a likelihood of success on its claim 
that SIU applied the policy in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner,165 intimating 
that SIU’s purposes (whatever they may be) would not be able to withstand the 
inevitable standard of strict scrutiny review that accompanies such regulations. 
Having analyzed all three reasons CLS was likely to succeed on the merits, 
the court concluded by balancing the harms.  Weighing in favor of CLS, the 
court reiterated that CLS had shown irreparable harm since a First Amendment 
violation always constitutes such injury, and reaffirmed that the controlling 
precedent of Healy held that “denying official recognition to a student 
organization is a significant infringement of the right of expressive 
association.”166  Further, the court concluded that as CLS had shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits of the free speech claim, “[o]ne way or the 
other, CLS has shown it likely that SIU has violated its First Amendment 
freedoms.”167 
Weighing against SIU, the court first noted that the district court had 
misread the standard of irreparable harm, which by itself necessarily 
constituted an abuse of discretion.168  Further, SIU had been unable to 
demonstrate they would incur any harm whatsoever beyond “the hardship 
 
 163. Walker, 453 F.3d at 866–67 (emphasis added). 
 164. Id. at 867. 
 165. Id.  The dissent objected to the decision to rule on the free speech claim since the record 
was admittedly incomplete.  See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 166. Walker, 453 F.3d at 867. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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associated with being required to recognize a student organization it believes is 
violating the university’s antidiscrimination policy.”169  This harm did not 
suffice, however, as CLS had demonstrated likelihood of success on its claims 
that SIU had violated its First Amendment rights—since SIU’s claimed harm 
was predicated on an interest that violated the constitutional rights of CLS, 
such harm was in fact “no harm at all.”170  Thus, because SIU would sustain no 
harm upon a grant of the injunction and CLS would incur irreparable harm 
upon its denial, the court reversed and remanded the decision of the district 
court, ordering that the preliminary injunction be entered against SIU.171 
B. The Dissent 
Judge Wood dissented from the majority,172 opining that the decision was 
only “possible . . . by asking the wrong questions, and thus arriving at the 
wrong answers.”173  Taking the record as it stood,174 the dissent disagreed that 
CLS had carried its burden, arguing it failed to show a likelihood of success on 
the merits of any of its claims and it failed to show it would suffer irreparable 
harm outweighing the harm that SIU would incur upon reversal.175 
First, Judge Wood rejected the majority’s distinction between 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and sexual conduct.176  His 
primary contention was that there was no support or opposition in the record 
for the idea that CLS would or had actually allowed a homosexual who chose 
not to be sexually active to be a CLS member or leader, or that heterosexuals 
who participated in non-marital sexual conduct had ever been or would ever be 
prevented from CLS membership or leadership capabilities.177 
Next, Judge Wood argued CLS had not shown a likelihood of success on 
its claim that SIU had violated its rights of expressive association because the 
case at hand was distinguishable from Dale and Healy.178  He differentiated 
Dale by saying the present case was not one of forced inclusion because SIU 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Walker, 453 F.3d.at 867. 
 172. Id.at 867–76 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 867. 
 174. Judge Wood’s first contention was that much of the majority opinion was based upon a 
record that was far too incomplete to support the decision.  See id. at 869.  Due to the state of the 
record, Judge Wood argued that it was “virtually impossible to evaluate the Law School’s action 
with respect to CLS without knowing whether it conforms or not to the treatment of similar 
organizations.”  Id. at 870.  As such, he argued that the temporary injunction should be dissolved 
so that SIU could enforce its policies until the case was decided in full on the merits.  Id. at 867. 
 175. Id. at 872. 
 176. See Walker, 453 F.3d at 873. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 873–74. 
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did not force CLS to accept anyone like the statute in Dale would have forced 
the Boy Scouts to do; rather, SIU had “simply declined to give certain 
additional assistance (financial and in-kind) to organizations that violate its 
nondiscrimination policy.”179  He also argued the situation was quite different 
from the events in Healy because SIU had not banned CLS from meeting on 
university grounds and because technological advances since the 1970s 
enabled CLS to maintain a campus presence outside of the scope of official 
university recognition, one that was not available to the challengers in 
Healy.180 
Finally, Judge Wood turned to the balancing of the harms.181  While 
conceding that CLS had a valid interest in its rights to expressive association, 
he also found that nothing SIU had done directly impeded those rights, and any 
indirect effects were “mild.”182  Further, the dissent found SIU had very 
important interests at stake.  First, SIU had a compelling interest in obtaining a 
diverse student body, and a decision that required them to include 
discriminatory groups “might undermine their ability to attain such 
diversity.”183  Second, relying on dicta from Grutter v. Bollinger,184 Judge 
Wood argued SIU itself had compelling expressive association and free speech 
interests in preventing CLS from spreading its message, so its harm “at the 
least, must be balanced against the harm to SIU from being forced to accept 
into its expressive association a group that undermines its message of 
nondiscrimination and diversity.”185 
 
 179. Id. at 873–74 (Judge Wood failed to respond to the majority’s contention that 
derecognition goes beyond a mere “failure to fund.”). 
 180. Id. at 874. 
 181. Judge Wood also refused to accept the majority’s finding that CLS had shown a 
likelihood of success on its free speech claim, primarily because the state of the record was too 
incomplete to show SIU had applied its Affirmative Action/EEO policy in a discriminatory way.  
Id.  Specifically, he found the constitutions of the other student organizations that had been 
offered as evidence were “too weak a reed on which to rely” and with the lack of other evidence, 
the court had “no way of knowing whether those organizations were actively discriminating on a 
prohibited basis.”  Id. 
 182. Id. at 875. 
 183. Id. 
 184. 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is 
essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”). 
 185. Walker, 453 F.3d at 875–76.  Judge Wood distinguished this argument from the similar 
argument that failed in Rumsfeld, see supra, notes 92–94 and accompanying text, by noting that 
the law schools in Rumsfeld were trying to exclude outsiders whose speech was not a part of the 
school’s expressive association, whereas here, CLS was effectively attempting to force the school 
to accept the speech of someone who would be an “insider.”  Thus, while the Solomon 
Amendment would not force a school to accept a member it does not desire to have among its 
ranks, a holding for CLS would do so.  Walker, 453 F.3d at 876. 
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IV.  THE RAMIFICATIONS OF WALKER 
A. What Can Law Schools Do? 
A central question remaining after Walker is what the decision, and the 
Dale-era of expressive association in general, means for the many public law 
schools in America that wish to fight discrimination against homosexuals in 
their student organizations.  In light of the recent decisions in Hurley, Dale, 
and Rumsfeld, the addition of Walker likely spells a great deal of trouble for 
the types of inclusive policies schools such as Southern Illinois University 
have hoped would ensure a welcoming and open educational environment for 
all of their students. 
In this Author’s opinion, until the Court is prepared to recognize 
discrimination against homosexuals as a compelling interest,186 law school 
policies that force student groups to include individuals as members whom 
they do not wish to embrace will, in all likelihood, see results similar to those 
in Hurley, Dale, Rumsfeld, and Walker, rather than the inclusive mandates of 
Roberts, Rotary Club, and New York State Club. 
The remainder of this Comment is predicated upon the contention that 
Walker (combined with the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence outlined 
above) stands for the idea that expressive organizations that can prove their 
message will be impaired by including homosexuals as members have a First 
Amendment right not to admit such individuals.  With this view on the state of 
the law, the remainder of this Comment attempts to determine how public law 
schools can endeavor to stop discrimination against homosexuals in their 
student organizations without violating the First Amendment. 
1. A New Approach is Necessary 
The majority in Walker acknowledged that a public university has an 
interest in ending discrimination in its student organizations.187  The court 
restricted the reach of that interest, however, holding that no antidiscrimination 
policy can be applied to an expressive organization if the purpose of the policy 
is to suppress or to promote any one particular viewpoint.188  A state is free to 
promote the ideas it wishes, but it cannot do so by “interfer[ing] with speech 
for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a 
disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the 
 
 186. The Author makes no prediction as to when or if this will occur.  Even Justice Stevens’s 
dissent in Dale, the Supreme Court writing most willing to extend protection to homosexuals on 
this issue, stopped short of explicitly finding homosexuality to be a compelling state interest.  See 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 663–700 (2000). 
 187. See Walker, 453 F.3d at 863. 
 188. Id. 
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government.”189  The Seventh Circuit stated that SIU could not identify a 
single purpose for forcing CLS to include homosexuals as members beyond 
SIU’s simple disagreement with its views about the rights of homosexuals and 
SIU’s hopes for  “eradicating or neutralizing” such beliefs.190 
Clearly, the court in Walker felt SIU was interfering with protected speech 
purely because it disagreed with the message of that speech.  This 
understanding causes a huge problem for law schools, because the truth in 
many cases is likely that the court was exactly right.  Many schools would 
probably admit that they completely disagree with the viewpoints of groups 
that discriminate against homosexuals, and that they do not want to allow 
student groups to express such a message on their campus.  This is almost 
exactly what FAIR argued in Rumsfeld.191  Since the Supreme Court has failed 
to recognize the protection of homosexuals as a compelling state interest, 
however, the frank reality is that this interest simply is not good enough.  No 
school will be able to promote the kind of tolerance and inclusiveness it wishes 
when its argument boils down to the fact that it dislikes the message the 
challenging group wishes to send. 
A new approach is necessary.  Schools need to focus their efforts in a 
different direction.  Instead of being dedicated purely to a one-sided, legislative 
attack on the eradication of conflicting viewpoints, schools need to find ways 
to make conversations about discrimination a two-way street, one upon which 
all viewpoints are allowed to travel.  If free speech in universities truly is to 
operate in the marketplace of ideas,192 schools must realize they are merely a 
powerful market force, not the holders of a monopoly on the public discourse 
inside the hallways of America’s institutions of higher learning. 
 
 189. Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 
U.S. 557, 579 (1995)). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68 
(2006) (“FAIR argues that the Solomon Amendment violates law schools’ freedom of expressive 
association.  According to FAIR, law schools’ ability to express their message that discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation is wrong is significantly affected by the presence of military 
recruiters on campus and the schools’ obligation to assist them.”). 
 192. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But 
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe . . . 
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is 
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  That at any rate is the theory 
of our Constitution.”); see also Note, Leaving Religious Students Speechless: Public University 
Antidiscrimination Policies and Religious Student Organizations, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2882, 
2884–85 (2005) (“The real marketplace of ideas operating at practically every public university . 
. . is actually more likely to be located in the university’s forum of student organizations than in 
its classrooms.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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This means that a respect for the free speech rights of all students is 
necessary.193  In a world where might does not make right, the way to make 
headway in fighting discrimination will be to change people’s minds, 
particularly by encouraging students to interact with people whose views do 
not match their own.  In other words, the First Amendment should not be seen 
as a barrier to a school’s inclusive goals—indeed, quite the opposite.  The First 
Amendment itself can be the instrument for effecting inclusion and equality—
the First Amendment in all its forms—debate, discussion, and co-existence.  
The remainder of this Comment will focus on ways for universities to 
encourage the acceptance of homosexuals, not merely by respecting the First 
Amendment rights of all, but by utilizing the powers afforded by the First 
Amendment itself to effect important changes. 
2. Legislative Methods For Fighting Discrimination Will Prove Unviable 
Because Viewpoint-Neutrality is a High Hurdle 
The right to expressive association is not an absolute right.194  The state 
can pass a law that infringes on this right, but such a regulation will be subject 
to strict scrutiny.195  However, the analysis above shows that the type of anti-
discrimination policies employed in Walker are hardly on solid legal ground, 
and satisfying strict scrutiny will be unlikely.  Schools need to realize that if 
they are currently employing anti-discrimination policies that apply to student 
organizations which prevent them from keeping homosexuals out of their 
groups, those policies are likely to be challenged as unconstitutional.  As such, 
schools need to consider other ways to promote their interests. 
In a legal universe where homosexual rights do not constitute a compelling 
state interest, there are two alternative approaches.  The first, one that would 
appear to be difficult to bring to fruition, would be to find a purpose for ending 
the discrimination that is not related to viewpoint.  The second, which would 
seem to be more viable, would be to find ways of promoting the viewpoint and 
messages that a school embraces without violating First Amendment rights by 
interfering with the message a particular student organization wishes to 
articulate. 
In the context of universities, legislative alternatives to fighting 
discrimination, while perhaps not altogether unworkable, are limited in utility 
for two major reasons.  First and most obviously, the purpose of eradicating 
discriminatory viewpoints, quite simply, exists.196  Many schools will want to 
 
 193. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (“The vigilant protection of 
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.”). 
 194. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Walker, 453 F.3d at 861. 
 195. Walker, 453 F.3d at 861–62 (internal citations omitted). 
 196. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] OPEN ATTENDANCE 1277 
get rid of discriminatory viewpoints simply because they disagree with them, 
and this is not a legitimate reason for interfering with the right of association.  
When this illegitimate purpose remains in the background, any other purpose 
(no matter how legitimate) that accomplishes the same goal will automatically 
be suspect.  Any public university that finds a justifiable purpose unrelated to 
viewpoint for forcing inclusion of homosexuals in a student organization 
would still have to litigate the same battles regarding the illegitimate purposes 
that could account for the forced inclusion.  Further, the challenging group will 
have just as strong a claim to the exercise of its First Amendment rights as it 
would in a more explicit attempt to legislate based on viewpoint.  In light of 
the case law discussed within this Comment, such a battle is all but ensured of 
ending in a loss for the school. 
The second reason finding a purpose unconnected to viewpoint is so 
difficult is related to the first, but deserves its own treatment.  The problem 
here is that it seems highly unlikely that viewpoint can ever be entirely 
divorced from legislation aimed at ending discrimination against homosexuals.  
Because the Supreme Court has never found homosexual rights to be a 
compelling interest, any attempt to limit a group’s right to exclude 
homosexuals is inherently expressing a viewpoint—that discrimination against 
homosexuals is wrong, and those who think it is not should be stopped from 
promoting their message. 
Viewed in this light, it may seem the only difference between 
discrimination against women and discrimination against homosexuals is that 
the Supreme Court has found the women’s cause to be compelling and has not 
for homosexuals.  It is unlikely that Roberts, Rotary, or New York State Club 
would have come out any differently even if any of the claimants had a more 
powerful argument that the exclusion of women was a vital part of their 
expressive message that could not be expressed as well if women were among 
the group’s members.  Perhaps not even Alfalfa and his He-Man Women 
Hater’s Club of Little Rascals fame could succeed on a claim of expressive 
association in the twenty-first century.  Put simply, women’s equality is now 
considered a more important interest than First Amendment rights of 
association, but it would be hard to argue that policies aimed at promoting the 
inclusion of women are actually devoid of viewpoint discrimination. 
Walker illustrates this second point nicely.  While it would appear at first 
glance that a public law school’s interest in equal access to educational 
opportunity for all of its students is a viewpoint neutral purpose for a policy 
prohibiting discrimination, the Walker majority explicitly rejected that precise 
argument.  The court found that, “[c]ertainly the state has an interest in 
eliminating discriminatory conduct and providing for equal access to 
opportunities.  But the Supreme Court has made it clear that antidiscrimination 
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regulations may not be applied to expressive conduct with the purpose of either 
suppressing or promoting a particular viewpoint.”197  In other words, the 
majority refused to distinguish the motive of equal access to educational 
opportunities from viewpoint discrimination.198 
Still, because the Walker court did not reject outright the idea of equal 
access to educational opportunity as an important interest, there may be 
seemingly plausible ways of getting around the viewpoint-neutrality barriers 
facing a school that wishes to prevent discrimination against its students.  A 
derivative version of the SIU policy challenged in Walker that would come 
closest to eliminating concerns about its viewpoint-neutrality would be a 
blanket prohibition on discriminatory membership policies, one that did not list 
any protected categories of people.  A policy requiring every recognized 
student organization to allow anyone who wanted to join to be accepted as a 
member would be facially neutral and would be very easy to apply even-
handedly.  Of course, such a law would still be subject to strict scrutiny 
because it would force some groups to associate with those they do not wish to 
in violation of their right to expressive association.  However, the school could 
mount a much stronger argument that it had a compelling interest unrelated to 
the suppression of ideas with a policy that was applicable to all student 
organizations and all classes of students if it was neutral on its face.  In the 
end, however, this sort of plan does little in the way of avoiding litigation since 
it would impinge the rights of every single student group with less than fully 
open membership policies.199  It also does nothing to promote open debate 
rather than coercion through forced silence, a First Amendment value that 
should be at the forefront of a school’s concern.200 
A more experimental approach a school could take would involve an 
attempt to shift the underlying focus of its anti-discrimination policy.  
 
 197. Walker, 453 F.3d at 863 (internal citations omitted). 
 198. Id. at 858.  Because the SIU policy in Walker specifically mentions sexual orientation as 
a protected category, however, Walker probably should not be read unequivocally to stand for the 
premise that policies aimed at equal educational opportunity are always viewpoint based.  The 
SIU policy guaranteeing equal educational opportunities does explicitly mention “sexual 
preference” as a protected category against discrimination, but it also includes the categories of 
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, status as a veteran of the Vietnam Era, 
and marital status, implying that the difference between viewpoint discrimination and viewpoint 
neutrality often comes down to little more than whether or not the protection of a particular 
category of people constitutes a compelling governmental interest. 
 199. See Leaving Religious Students Speechless: Public University Antidiscrimination 
Policies and Religious Student Organizations, supra note 192, at 298–99 (explaining how many 
groups’ very existence depend on the ability to discriminate in membership, even if the person 
being discriminated against enjoys protected status or is exercising a constitutional right). 
 200. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence 
coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form.”). 
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Basically, a school would argue its policy is not aimed at viewpoint; it is aimed 
at the societal harm that discrimination against homosexuals inflicts.  Insight 
into this idea can be gained from a somewhat unlikely source—feminist 
criticism of pornography—as seen in the famous obscenity case American 
Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut201 and the scholarly criticism it 
provoked.  Hudnut involved an Indianapolis anti-pornography ordinance that 
was struck down as an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment in a 
Seventh Circuit opinion written by Judge Frank Easterbrook.202  The law, 
drafted in large part by renowned feminist scholar Catherine MacKinnon,203 
was quite novel.  It made no reference to the general obscenity standards such 
as prurient interest, offensiveness, or standards of the community,204 but 
instead aimed to prevent only pornography that debased the equality of 
women.205 
The law was struck down as unconstitutional for several reasons, but one 
of its fatal shortcomings was that it tried to eliminate this type of pornography 
by labeling it “low value,” while at the same time arguing it could be regulated 
because it “influences social relations and politics on a grand scale, that it 
controls attitudes at home and in the legislature.”206  Judge Easterbrook 
rejected this argument as precluding itself.207  The fact that pornography had 
the power to perpetuate the subordination of women “simply demonstrates the 
power of pornography as speech.”208  The power to influence attitudes proves 
speech has value, and since our “Constitution forbids the state to declare one 
perspective right and silence opponents. . . .  the government must leave to the 
people the evaluation of ideas.”209  Implicitly, Judge Easterbrook’s contention 
about the power of pornography seems applicable to the power of the message 
that homosexuality is not an appropriate lifestyle, and this in turn is the reason 
legislation against such speech is so often rejected as an attempt to suppress the 
conveyance of ideas. 
Embedded in Indianapolis’s argument, however, was the idea that 
pornography should be legislated against purely because of the harm it 
produces.  Criticism of the Hudnut decision elicited support for this claim, with 
scholars arguing that such a law was constitutional because 
 
 201. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
 202. Id. at 324, 332. 
 203. See id. at 325. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id.  In all, the Indianapolis ordinance prohibited six enumerated types of pornography 
involving the “sexually explicit subordination of women.”  See id. 
 206. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 331. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 329. 
 209. Id. at 325, 327. 
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[t]he legislation aimed at pornography as defined here would be directed at 
harm rather than at viewpoint.  Its purpose would be to prevent sexual violence 
and discrimination, not to suppress expression of a point of view. . . . Because 
of its focus on harm, antipornography legislation would not pose the dangers 
associated with viewpoint-based restrictions.210 
A school could try to make take this argument by applying it to the social and 
educational harms of discrimination against homosexuals.  Of course, there are 
major obstacles, not the least of which is that the argument has never been 
successfully made.  Further, Professor Cass Sunstein notes that one of the 
major advantages of the argument in the context of pornography is that the 
government would have “concrete data to back its legitimate purposes,”211 an 
advantage a law school would not likely have on the issue of educational 
discrimination against homosexuals, data that would be difficult and expensive 
to obtain.  There is also criticism of such an approach.  For example, Professor 
Laurence Tribe argued that the distinction between harm and viewpoint was 
superficial and that “[a]ll viewpoint-based regulations are targeted at some 
supposed harm, whether it be linked to an unsettling ideology . . . [or] to 
socially shunned practices.”212  In light of all these impediments, this option 
does not seem particularly viable at present, but is certainly an interesting 
proposal that might be worthy of further exploration, especially as social 
science data emerges relating to these issues. 
Before moving on, it is worth mentioning the necessity of neutrality in the 
application of the non-discrimination policies that do exist.  It would be naïve 
to assume that every public law school will eliminate policies similar to SIU’s, 
since many schools will still seek to keep specific language regarding sexual 
orientation in their non-discrimination policies, regardless of the implications 
of doing so after Walker.  This being the case, it should be noted, though it is 
seemingly obvious, that if a school insists on keeping policies similar to SIU’s, 
every student organization needs to be held to the same standards. 
The Walker court took special note of arguments by CLS that other student 
organizations at SIU that held or applied exclusionary membership policies 
were never threatened with derecognition, saying this was “strong evidence 
that the policy has not been applied in a viewpoint neutral way.”213  CLS 
complained about this treatment, and the court held that SIU’s response to 
these claims—”there is no evidence that other groups would continue to 
discriminate if threatened with nonrecognition,”—was a “nonstarter.”214  As 
 
 210. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 612 
(1986). 
 211. Id. 
 212. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 925 (2d ed. 1988). 
 213. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 214. Id. 
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the court observed, the very point of having the policy is for it to act as a 
standing threat of derecognition to any student organization that is unwilling to 
comply.215 
It should be clear that any law school insisting on keeping similar policies 
should not, for any reason, apply them haphazardly or unevenly.  There is 
simply no rationale for inviting the legal battles likely to ensue, beyond the 
even more obvious considerations of promoting fairness and honesty in policy-
making.  Even if a law school could find a court that would be open to 
disagreement with the decisions in Walker or Dale, a substantial problem 
remains if other student organizations are allowed to break the policy being 
challenged without repercussion, and the school would stand to lose an 
important legal triumph.  There is simply no straight-faced way to argue that a 
policy is not aimed at viewpoint if it is not applied neutrally and even-
handedly. 
In the end, while it may not be impossible, finding a viewpoint-neutral way 
of legislatively promoting homosexual rights in opposition to the First 
Amendment rights of those who wish to express views hostile to the inclusion 
of homosexuals is certainly a daunting task.  In light of the hurdles detailed 
above, and the possibility that an interest in equality of educational opportunity 
may not be good enough, it may not be worth the energy and costs involved 
with making an argument for a school’s interest in promoting tolerance or 
inclusiveness.  Thus, in a legal universe where homosexual rights do not 
constitute a compelling interest and in which little possibility exists for an 
antidiscrimination policy that proves viewpoint-neutral, we must look 
elsewhere for a means by which law schools might successfully end 
discrimination against homosexuals in their student organizations. 
3. Value-Promotion Without Infringement—Effectively Using the First 
Amendment To Promote Tolerance 
A second alternative—finding ways to promote a public law school’s 
interest in ending discrimination against homosexuals in their student 
organizations without impinging on a group’s First Amendment rights—is 
legally plausible, in this Author’s opinion.  The following analysis will attempt 
to outline basic plans a law school could take to promote a message of 
inclusivity, along with some possible legal and practical implications of such 
actions.  This analysis is animated by the conviction that the law school should 
always attempt to promote its values without impinging on the beliefs and 
rights of any of its students. 
 
 215. Id. at 86. 
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a. Tailoring Policy Language Towards Inclusiveness 
One possibly feasible (but complicated) alternative would be for a law 
school to attempt to tailor a policy to the exact holdings of Dale and Walker.  
Such a policy would read (rather cumbersomely) that “No student organization 
may refuse membership to any person on any basis that would not interfere 
with the organization’s ability to exercise its First Amendment rights.”  This 
sort of policy would technically allow an organization to express its message, 
but to do so it would have to ensure its organizational policies were shaped to 
meet the burden of proving why accepting a particular person would infringe 
on its rights.  One of Justice Stevens’s major arguments in his dissent in Dale 
was that the Boy Scouts had not proven that keeping homosexuals out of its 
midst affected its ability to express its message.216  While it is unlikely certain 
faith-based organizations (such as CLS) would have as difficult a time proving 
this as did the Boy Scouts in Dale,217 the balance is shifted towards more 
inclusive interests when the group asserting the right has a burden of proving 
that its message will actually be impaired by inclusion of homosexuals.  Still, 
at least two major obstacles stand in the way of a policy of this sort.  The first 
relates to a potential legal deficiency, and the second to a concern over the 
intended function of the judiciary. 
First, a policy such as outlined above would clearly be subject to 
vagueness challenges.  Vagueness is a consideration of procedural due process 
that aims to ensure people or entities are aware of the criminal consequences of 
their actions by providing a “sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed 
conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.”218  A law or 
policy that is void for vagueness is one where a person “of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application . . . .”219  The example policy statement laid out above would likely 
be vague because an organization probably could not be expected to 
understand exactly where the line should be drawn as to which exclusionary 
 
 216. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 685 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
Justice Stevens writes “[a] State’s antidiscrimination law does not impose a ‘serious burden’ or a 
‘substantial restraint’ upon the group’s ‘shared goals’ if the group itself is unable to identify its 
own stance with any clarity.”  Id. 
 217. CLS had a stronger case in this respect than did the Boy Scouts, as evidenced by the 
sparse treatment this subject received in the Walker opinion.  This is nowhere more apparent than 
in the fact that the dissent in Walker limits its discussion of the expressive association claim to an 
argument that SIU did not require the CLS to accept anyone instead of claiming the CLS was 
unable to show the admittance of a homosexual to its membership would impair its message.  See 
Walker, 453 F.3d at 873 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 218. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1951).  The doctrine is not applied 
exclusively to criminal statutes.  Rather, it applies to statutes or policies that involve a “penalty.”  
See id. at 231. 
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policies are necessary to express its message and which policies would not 
interfere with its expressive message, without more guidance than is given in 
the example policy statement.  Since the whole point of this type of policy 
would be to avoid the pitfalls of viewpoint discrimination that more concrete 
direction would entail, adding any guiding details may defeat the purpose and 
supposed benefits of this strategy. 
Second, such a policy would create a very real concern over questions of 
judicial function; most importantly, it may be no part of a judge’s role to 
determine the subjective belief of an organization concerning whether the 
inclusion of an individual impairs its First Amendment rights.  This view of 
judicial function is one that sees a court’s job as entailing the duty to make a 
legal determination of whether a group’s rights have been infringed.  Nothing 
in that function involves a hunt for how sincere or consistent a group’s belief 
is, though that should obviously play a role in the determination of how 
seriously the challenged statute impinges upon the organization’s rights.  This 
is precisely the argument Chief Justice Rehnquist made in Dale when 
preaching deference to a group’s claim that its rights have been infringed upon: 
The New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the Boy Scouts’ beliefs and 
found . . .  that the exclusion of members like Dale “appears antithetical to the 
organization’s goals and philosophy.”  But our cases reject this sort of inquiry; 
it is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed values because they 
disagree with those values or find them internally inconsistent.220 
Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to state that an inquiry to “determine the 
nature of the Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to homosexuality” was not 
necessary,221 and that they could not “doubt that the Boy Scouts sincerely 
holds this view.”222  While Justice Stevens clearly did not accept this 
argument,223 his dissent failed to distinguish between adjudicating how 
seriously a challenged law impinges on a group’s rights in the context of strict 
scrutiny review, which is clearly a relevant determination,224 and passing 
judgment over what amounts to little more than an organization’s subjective 
belief that it has a cause of action. 
 
 220. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650–51 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 221. Id. at 651. 
 222. Id. at 653. 
 223. For just one example, see id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens wrote, 
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adopted an exclusionary membership policy and has no shared goal of disapproving of 
homosexuality.” Id. 
 224. Because one of the prongs of the strict scrutiny test is whether the state’s interest can be 
“achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms,” the strength of 
an organization’s claim will directly affect how closely tailored the law must be to restrict the 
least amount of associational freedom possible.  See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 
853, 861–62 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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In light of these objections to an imprecise and indefinitely worded policy, 
it would seem that despite its obvious benefits, such a choice may lead to 
litigation that would result in the invalidation of the policy as vague, and a 
different path should be utilized. 
b. University-Endorsed Campaigns For Tolerance 
One option to limit discrimination against homosexuals that could clearly 
be employed without violating expressive rights would be for a law school to 
take an active stance and campaign for its own views on open membership 
without actually requiring groups to abide by those views.  There is absolutely 
nothing that would prohibit a school from exercising its own First Amendment 
rights by voicing its own opinions on the benefits of open and non-
discriminatory student organizations. 
The Walker majority noted that a school is free to “promote all sorts of 
conduct in place of harmful behavior.”225  We see government advocate 
particular opinions as better than other views all of the time without passing a 
law that holding the alternative viewpoint is illegal, whether through television 
commercials urging college football fans to send their children to their favorite 
university or billboards advocating the purchase of toll road passes for quicker 
and easier travel on the state’s highway systems.  Each of these promotes a 
course of conduct as preferable to other alternatives, which inherently involves 
a statement that a particular way of thinking is also preferable to another—
University A offers a better learning environment than does University B, it is 
better to not have to stop at a toll booth and search for change than it is to do 
so—but neither requires someone to articulate a message they do not wish to, 
and thus these promotions do not violate rights of expressive association. 
Law schools do this sort of thing all of the time.  What school does not 
have hundreds of advertisements in its hallways for job opportunities it views 
as worthy of obtaining or does not hold workshops expressing its view of the 
best method of impeaching a witness?  There is simply no reason a public law 
school could not, and should not, choose to advocate what it feels to be a 
proper viewpoint—that student organizations should have open membership 
policies and that discrimination against homosexuals is improper.  As such, 
schools should consider hosting lectures, debates, and discussions that promote 
an interest in non-discrimination.  This choice violates the rights of none and 
advances persuasion as a method for changing attitudes rather than coercion. 
 
 225. Id. at 863 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-Sexual Group of 
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c. Open Attendance 
Of course, many schools may wish to do more than merely promote their 
own viewpoint, and there is at least one substantive, legislative method of 
furthering such goals whereby a public law school could implement a policy 
advancing its desires for reducing discrimination against homosexuals in its 
student organizations without violating First Amendment rights. 
Perhaps the best substantive policy option is the idea that a school could 
likely enforce a regulation requiring all student organizations to allow anyone 
who is a member of the school to attend group meetings, so long as the school 
does not force the group to offer membership to those who do not affirm the 
group’s shared message (an “open-attendance” policy).  While this was not 
precisely the controverted issue in Walker, the decision implicitly supports the 
idea that merely allowing someone who does not agree with or affirm a student 
organization’s beliefs or policies to attend a meeting does not interfere with the 
group’s rights of expressive association.226 
The Walker court held, “When the government forces a group to accept for 
membership someone the group does not welcome and the presence of the 
unwelcome person ‘affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate’ 
its viewpoint, the government has infringed on the group’s freedom of 
expressive association.”227  Read literally, this language supports the argument 
that if the government is not forcing a group to accept members it does not 
wish to recognize, no rights of expressive association have been violated. 
The rhetoric in Dale lends itself to the same argument—that a group is 
never stopped from promoting its message simply because someone who 
disagrees is present.  The Court focused purely on forced inclusion in a group’s 
membership: “Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair the 
ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends 
to express.”228  This, too, suggests a group’s rights are only hindered when it is 
forced to enroll unwanted individuals as official members. 
This argument for open attendance hinges on the idea that non-members of 
a group do not share in the group’s collective identity and thus have no voice 
in expressing the group’s message.  For all intents and purposes, such 
individuals are no different than any other person in the world.  Any message 
that individual expresses, whether explicitly through words or implicitly 
through actions or identities, is his or her message alone.229  At least two 
 
 226. Id. at 861.  The court uses language specific to forced membership in explaining why 
mandatory inclusion is a violation of the First Amendment: “When the government forces a group 
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contentions support this conclusion—the rejection of the theory that “mistaken 
belief” regarding a group’s message by outsiders constitutes a violation of the 
First Amendment, and repudiation of any differentiation between outsiders 
who attend a group’s meeting and outsiders who do not. 
First, the possibility that mistaken belief by outsiders as to what the 
message of a group actually is should not be considered ample grounds to 
support a claim for violation of expressive association.  This claim has already 
been implicitly rejected in First Amendment jurisprudence.  Directly on point 
is Dale (a case protecting and arguably expanding the rights of expressive 
association), which noted only that including unwanted individuals as 
members kept a group from promoting “those views, and only those views, that 
it intends to express.”230  This arguably amounts to a rejection of the idea that 
allowing mere attendance sends any message at all.  Further support is found in 
Hurley, even though the likelihood of mistaken belief must seem inherently 
present, and the Court discusses that exact possibility.231  The reality is that the 
case did not turn on such a contention.  The parade organizers did not win 
because the presence of outsiders held the potential to send a message they did 
not wish to express—they won precisely because their presence actually did 
send such a message.232  Thus, in this Author’s opinion, Hurley was much 
different than mere attendance at a group’s meetings; it amounted to the 
bestowing of a de facto membership upon individuals the association did not 
wish to include. This is strong proof that the attendance of nonmembers at a 
group’s private meetings does not send any message and has no bearing on a 
group’s rights of expressive association. 
Second, a distinction between the speech of non-member attendees and 
non-member, non-attendees is superficial.  An outsider who has no share in the 
control of a group does not become an insider merely by attending meetings.  
If the only benefit of membership in a group could be obtained through 
attendance at meetings, it is unlikely the group is organized around expressing 
a message as defined by the Court in Dale, and thus, would not be entitled to 
the protection of expressive association.233  No one would argue that the 
speech of a non-member of a group who has never attended that particular 
 
Army’s presence at a school did not impair the law schools’ message.  By analogy, a law school’s 
message should not effect a student organization’s message.  
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group’s meetings or had any real association with the group amounts to speech 
by the group.  When the only difference between outsiders and their 
relationship to a group is attendance at meetings, there is no real difference at 
all. 
To be sure, there is room for argument against a policy that would require 
open attendance.  Issues such as privacy, discriminatory application of policies, 
and violation of a group’s potential rights of intimate association are beyond 
the scope of this discussion, but there are some concerns worth referencing in 
further detail. 
First, open attendance, while certainly a step towards heightened 
inclusivity, does not achieve exactly what many schools will actually desire—
the potential for full inclusion of all students in all educational opportunities.  
For example, the CLS policies in Walker would actually permit open 
attendance.234  Related to this, the level of interest students would show in 
attending the meetings for groups of which they cannot become members, who 
do not share their values, and who do not actually desire their presence, is 
certainly uncertain. 
Most importantly, there are other ways a group could still mount an 
expressive association claim.  Whenever the government interferes with the 
internal affairs or structure of an association in a way that impairs the group’s 
ability to expound its message, a potential violation of its right to expressive 
association is at hand.235  It is not hard to imagine a scenario where the 
attendance of non-members at meetings could impair a group’s ability to 
express its message apart from any of the concerns discussed previously.  To 
mention a few possibilities, it could become significantly more difficult to 
conduct group meetings in an orderly fashion, or members might feel less 
camaraderie or trust in the organization and be afraid to express opinions that 
might be viewed as unpopular by those not espousing the group ethos.  Further, 
forced inclusion has never been viewed as the only infringement upon 
expressive association,236 and it is not completely implausible that open 
attendance could be added to the list. 
Despite these concerns, open attendance is an attractive option for schools 
desiring to take a proactive approach to making their student organizations 
more inclusive.  Open attendance goes far in meeting a school’s goals of 
student-group equality without violating the First Amendment rights of those 
students, thus satisfying what should be two paramount objectives of any law 
school.  While the prospect of litigation always remains a possibility, a school 
wishing to legislate against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
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would have a defensible position with an open-attendance policy, unlike many 
of the options outlined above. 
4. What Should Law Schools Do? 
In light of the above discussions, it is this Author’s belief that it will not be 
possible to completely eradicate discrimination against homosexuals among 
student organizations in public law schools without violating the First 
Amendment in a legal landscape where sexual orientation does not constitute a 
compelling state interest.  The simple truth is that the relevant Supreme Court 
case law since Healy has only protected the expressive association rights of 
women and groups who are trying to prevent homosexuals from becoming 
members.  With these thoughts at the forefront, it is this Author’s contention 
that the best method of fighting discrimination in public law school student 
organizations is for schools to adopt an open-attendance policy similar to the 
one described above, combined with a prominent public campaign of 
university-endorsed speech promoting the school’s preference for equality and 
inclusivity among its student organizations. 
It is possible to promote a school’s interest in inclusiveness without 
violating the First Amendment, and this should be every school’s goal.  If one 
believes that First Amendment rights “acquire a special significance in the 
university setting, where the free and unfettered interplay of competing views 
is essential to the institution’s educational mission,”237 then it is hard to support 
any plan where the price is abrogation of expressive rights.  Further, none of 
the activities and freedoms protected by the First Amendment could be 
“vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative 
freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also 
guaranteed.”238  Thus, as important as equality of opportunity is to the 
educational environment of America’s public law schools, a dynamic 
protection of the First Amendment rights of its students is of even greater 
consequence. 
The acceptance, or potential acceptance, of homosexuality in the 
mainstream of American culture, should not be enough to force those who 
disagree to give up their First Amendment rights.  As stated by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in the majority opinion of Dale: 
Indeed, it appears that homosexuality has gained greater societal acceptance.  
But this is scarcely an argument for denying First Amendment protection to 
those who refuse to accept these views.  The First Amendment protects 
expression, be it of the popular variety or not. . . . And the fact that an idea 
may be embraced and advocated by increasing numbers of people is all the 
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more reason to protect the First Amendment rights of those who wish to voice 
a different view.239 
Chief Justice Rehnquist reminds us that the First Amendment is not subject to 
the changing viewpoints on what constitutes popular morality in America. 
In the environment of America’s public law schools, these words are 
difficult to contextualize.  Law schools often consider themselves to be the 
starting point of social change and enlightenment, but they also almost 
certainly believe themselves to be the ultimate protectors of the First 
Amendment.  Added to this dilemma is the fact that both sides of the issue see 
themselves as the minority voice, a voice so many law schools consider to be 
the most worthy of protection.  It is this predicament that makes the fight 
against discrimination in student organizations so difficult, but this is also what 
makes the solution offered here so viable.  Schools need to balance their desire 
for inclusivity with a healthy respect for the First Amendment rights of every 
student, and this combination affords them the chance to do both.  By adopting 
the open-attendance policy, they maintain the requisite deference to the First 
Amendment while legislating against what they consider unacceptable 
behavior, and by endorsing a campaign of their own speech, they put their 
money where their mouth is.  The message this sends is that the school 
believes discrimination against homosexuals is wrong, but instead of simply 
banning dissenting opinions and coercing compliance, they are relying on 
success through the merit of their argument, a concept critical to the 
educational mission of any law school—that of winning advocacy. 
Admittedly, the situation here is tricky, and the First Amendment does not 
always provide easy answers, but Justice Brandeis once explained how this 
pivotal freedom should operate: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was 
to make men free to develop their faculties . . . .  They believed that freedom to 
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the 
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly 
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily 
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine . . . .  [T]hey 
knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its 
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; 
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces 
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss 
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy 
for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied 
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the 
argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of 
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governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and 
assembly should be guaranteed.240 
Perhaps the answer to the problem of discrimination in student organizations is 
not as clear as we might like, but the open-attendance policy respects Justice 
Brandeis’s vision of the core meaning of the First Amendment.  Public law 
schools should feel free to promote their viewpoints and legislate to enforce 
them, but they must never do so at the cost of their students’ rights, for such a 
price threatens to bankrupt the First Amendment, surely a tragedy of great 
magnitude. 
CONCLUSION 
Christian Legal Society v. Walker confirmed that the Dale-era of 
expressive association continues to govern litigation between state attempts to 
prevent discrimination against homosexuals and the private associations that 
wish to prevent homosexuals from being a part of their groups.  Public law 
schools across the country need to realize that until the protection of 
homosexuals is considered a compelling interest, they will likely not be able to 
stop most of their student organizations from discriminating against the 
school’s homosexual students merely by the use of a nondiscrimination policy.  
The open-attendance policy outlined here, combined with an active campaign 
of university-endorsed speech advocating tolerance, provides these schools 
with a viable method for promoting their interests while maintaining a healthy 
respect for the First Amendment rights of each of their students.  This is a 
balance that will never be easy to strike, but in a time where so many 
American students with different values and viewpoints must coexist with one 
another, it is imperative that schools do whatever they can to ensure their 
students have every available means of striking the balance between First 
Amendment rights and tolerance. 
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